PLURALISM, THE MILITARY COUPS AND THE RPP.
1965-1980

The Pluralisation of Politics and the Re-identification of the RPP:

The Repositioning of the Party as ãLeft of the Centerä.

The years between 1965 and 1980 saw the transition to pluralist democracy . During this period  the RPP began to understand the rules of the game and tried to reposition itself. It  had learned that anti-systemic factors (i.e. military coups) would not help a political party; at best it could only serve or help itself in the short run. The partyâs very survival depended on its adaptation to the new system. 
The signs of change were apparent as early as October 1964, when the party congress adopted a declaration entitled ãOur Ideal of a Progressive Turkeyä, developed by Turhan Feyziogu and Bülent Ecevit, two intellectual leaders widely regarded as rising stars. This declaration dealt with such topics as land reform, social justice, social security, economic development, democratic etatism, education, secularism, the fine arts, nationalism and youth. 
Within this trend, presenting a declaration, Inönü explained the maxim 'left of center' to describe the partyâs position. Inönü tried to explain this ãleft of centerä by giving reference to the partyâs past: ãThe RPP is an etatist party and it is obvious that with such a title party should be located on the left of center. Etatism as an important tool of our economic life is still unique today, as it was in 1923âs wrecked Turkey as a developmentalistic solution.ä 
Inönü, in a magazine interview a month later, added that, ã Reaching the level of modern civilization can only be achieved with etatism. While making our development in social and economic ways, we wanted to reposition ourselves between right and left. For forty years, when I have said that we are etatist, I meant the same thing. Thatâs why I have said that we are on the left center. We have been Îto the left of centerâ since we declared that we are secularist. If you are populist, you are Îto the center of the leftâ.ä  In a speech he made on the radio, Inönü summarized the maxim left of the center: ãNot only the RPP but also the State and the Constitution are to the left center.ä 
The RPP was unlikely to win the election in 1965 because in spite of its political record, the supporters of the status quo considered it too progressive and the radicals were disillusioned with it for being progressive in words but conservative in action.  In other words, as Karpat explains, ãthe radicals within the RPP blamed the partyâs electoral failure on its half hearted commitment to social democracy, while the conservative wing blamed it on the partyâs alliance with socialism.ä The party did not have enough time to explain itself adequately to the masses. The decision to introduce the slogan was regarded as an investment that would pay off, not in 1965, but in 1969, or even 1973. For the moment it was a question of defeating the conservatives in the party and establishing a consensus around the new orientation. 
In a report published for the 18th  RPP convention in October 1966, it was officially declared that ãthe RPP is a party Îto the left of centerâ and it is not a socialist party and never will be.ä  Inönü felt the need to re-explain the situation: ãI have been an etatist for forty years. They say that being an etatist might mean being leftist. If it is so, I am a leftist. If being a populist meant leftist, I am leftist.ä 
Within the party, Ecevit published a book named ãOrtanýn Soluä (Left of Center)â to explain the repositioning.   In the introduction, he explained that the book (or one can say the new positioning itself) was,  ãnot a scientific study.ä  This was an explanation and reasoning of a humanitarian way of thinking and its political action. He added that, äthe new positioning is democratic, social egalitarian and revolutionary.ä 
With the new positioning, we see the first reinterpretation of the RPPâs original ideals. It is important that the later conflict between Inönü and Ecevit began to emerge from these ideological interpretations at this time as evident from their references. Inönü directly referred to the past to explained the present while Ecevit referred to the past for future action.  To conclude the arguments, one can say that the change in the RPP in the mid- 1960s was pragmatic rather than ideological. After these reforms, the middle of the road group, headed by Turhan Feyzioðlu, resigned and formed its own Reliance Party (RP) in 1967. 
The 19th  party convention was held in 1968. The Convention report states: ãThe politics of ÎTo the Left of Centerâ will make reforms to remove all the obstacles that bind Turkey to the relations of underdevelopment such as feudalism and bureaucratic authoritarianism. The party will re-establish the relations between human-land, capital-labor, producer-consumer, people- state, according to the (emerging) industrial society.ä  This report shows a radical departure from the ideal of populism and also re-defines the partyâs popular  base. It aims to break the old coalitions, presenting a new strategy and a new base for  real (systemic) popular support. In the election report of 1969, it states that ãthe aim of the RPPâs Îthe Left of Centerâ systemic change program is to make a revolution at the base of the structureä. 
With these developments, the party began to transform itself.  In the elections of 1969, the party  began to gain votes in developed areas while losing in underdeveloped places. The popular base of the party began to shift as it learned to cooperate with the political system.
In the 20th  RPP Convention, held in July 1970, the election results were explained in a report by the party assembly.   ãIn the new Turkey, the people, with their weak economic power, have begun to assert their weight in society. General voting patterns enable people to reflect their weight in political life. In contrast, the civil and military bureaucrats  have begun to lose their (economic and political) influence as the people begin to assert more weight in society.ä 
This social change unfortunately resulted in increasing  anarchy and chaos in Turkey beginning from the mid 60s. In the process of Modernization, the expectations of the society, especially the youth, grew faster than the economic conditions. The relatively free atmosphere of the 1960s led to the emergence of ideological differences and their establishment in the universities. The events of 1968 in Europe had even a greater impact on students in Turkey than in most other countries. 
The growth rate of the villages began to drop after 1965. The immigration to cities was the most important source for the social change, as evidenced in the effects of urbanization or ruralisation of the urban center.
After the mid-sixties JP governments led by Süleyman Demirel continued the capitalist integration begun by the DP. The JP then favored  big capital and gave its social base the traditional small capital, leaving no alternative but the formation of its own parties. This fragmented right became the major source of political instability. The imbalanced wealth distribution of the 1960âs added to the atmosphere of social unrest. The opposition from within and with out increased and the government became very tangible in power . The military decided that the situation could only be rectified by another coup.
 
 

The Second Coup  and the Ideological Division within the RPP .

The change in the political system and the increased pluralisation in the 1960s effected the RPP and also created unrest among the anti-systemic forces. The military coup of 12 March 1971 was a sort of ãvetoä by the military of the current situation, and as Hale says, had a ãmoderate presiding rule.ä   On 12 March, the military interrupted the democracy indirectly and began an attack against the civil rights and liberties given in the 1961 Constitution. After the coup, the high commander, Memduh Taðmaç, thus explained the situation to Inönü who was visiting him: ãThe social awakening had gone further than the economic development. Hence, we felt the need to balance the level of social rights with the level of economic development.ä 
Given its collective character,  it was difficult to discern which faction in the armed forces had seized the power during the coup. The  liberal intelligentsia hoped that it was the  radical-reformist wing (governors)  led by Muhsin Batur, the commander of the air force, who was in favor of implementing the reforms envisaged by the 1961 Constitution.  A memorandum produced by the junta seemed to justify this hope: after demanding the resignation of the government, which was held responsible for driving the country into anarchy, fratricidal strife, and social and economic unrest, the commanders asked for the formation, within the context of democratic principles, of a strong and credible government which would neutralize the current anarchy and which, inspired by Atatürkâs views, would implement the reformist laws envisaged by the constitution. 
Priority was given to the restoration of law and order. The commanders intended  to influence events with constant (indirect) pressure, hence their  first problem was to find a neutral prime minister acceptable to the Assembly. Professor Nihat Erim, a former (moderate) member of the RPP, was chosen as the appropriate candidate. He was asked to form the government on 1 March. His appointment, however, divided the RPP and led to a major split in 1972. Inönü, who initially had been critical of the military regime, changed his tune with Erimâs appointment. Bülent Ecevit, the Partyâs general secretary, however, remained an unrepentant critic. 
Erim  became the figure head of a predominantly conservative and repressive regime, to be discarded as soon as he  had served his purpose. Thus far from being a national government capable of creating consensus, the Erim government proved to be a cabinet full of antagonism and contradictions. 
On 22 April, deputy premier Said Kokas, the militaryâs representative in the cabinet, announced that  ãFrom today on, we are declaring war on all those who come out against the law.ä Under marital law, the political life  of Turkey was totally paralyzed. Two days later, two prominent journalists, Çetin Altan, a former Workersâ Party deputy, and Ýlhan Selçuk, a radical Kemalist, were taken into custody,  the first indication of an impending crackdown on intellectuals. The  publications of the left were proscribed; in contrast, the publications of the militant, neo-fascist right continued to circulate freely. On 3 May, the martial law  authorities declared all strikes and lockouts illegal. 
The government focused its attention on amending the Constitution, which its conservative members blamed for the countryâs woes. The rights and freedoms guaranteed  by the 1961 Constitution, which had permitted popular participation (of civil servants) in politics for the first time in Turkeyâs history, were curbed so that, in Professor Erimâs words, ãthe integrity of the State.... and the nation, the Republic, national security, and public order could be protected.ä  The amended constitution guaranteed that there was no going back to the period before 12 March. Erim and the military High Command argued that the democratization of the 60âs had proven too costly and risky for Turkey. They concluded that a liberal constitution was a luxury for Turkey, a luxury a developing society could not afford if it desired rapid progress along the road to capitalism. 
By the summer of 1973  the military-backed regime had accomplished most of its political goals. The constitution had been amended  so as to strengthen the State against civil society, special courts had been put in place to deal directly with all forms of dissent quickly and ruthlessly, the universities  had been harnessed so as to curb the radicalism of students and faculty alike, and the trade unions had been pacified and left in an ideological vacuum with the official dissolution of the Workersâ Party   by the government .
Once the Workersâ Party had been forced from the scene, its mantle waited to be taken up again. After 1971, the RPP was the best party, placed to do that if only it could abandon its ambivalence towards social democracy.
Ecevit continued his opposition within the party, arguing for a policy of working with the people rather than them. He asked his party to abandon its elitists notions about the masses being ignorant and not knowing what was good for them. ãIt is necessary for us to give up claiming that only intellectuals know what is best and to accept that these people know perfectly well where their interests lie. If so far people have not voted for the reformists forces (i.e. the RPP) that has not been because of their backwardness but because they have seen that the reformists were alienated from them. ã 
 

The Polarization of Politics and  the Transformation of the RPP.

The coup of 12 March signaled an important turning point leading to the transformation of both the system and the RPP. The coup might not have been the only reason for change but it played the role of a catalyst, increasing the speed of the change.
The RPPâs official attitude towards the coup created  duality within the party and opened the way to a contest for the leadership and ideology. Inönü wanted to cooperate with the military-aided the Erim government while Ecevit saw that that kind of cooperation would harm the party in the long run.  In the 5th  Extraordinary Party Convention, held in  May 1972, for the party assembly elections, the lists of the Ecevit and Inönü were contested. Ecevit openly declared that this election should not only be considered an ordinary one: The assembly would vote for either a democratic party,  loyal to the laws, or for a one- man party loyal to its leader.  For this elections Ecevitâs roster won the vote of confidence: Inönü felt compelled to resign. Kili writes that, ãthe coup (27 May) had a positive effect on the RPP as it led to a change in leadership.ä 
The 21st  RPP convention, held in June 1972, put an official end to the inter-party struggle. The report, agreed upon and published in time for the convention, stated that ãThose who believe revolution (reform) should be achieved not by the people but above the people by a progressive intelligentsia can not be together with us. The intelligentsia, obviously, will have a leading position in the revolution. This duty must be achieved by the people, not despite (and for) the people. Those whose notion of revolution does not depend on this populism are the those who are alienated from todayâs RPP and are bureaucratic revolutionists.ä  This declaration should be regarded as a radical departure from the ideals of populism and revolutionism of the one-party rule era when the RPP had been regarded as ãthe school for the education of the people.ä 
With the resignation of  Ismet Inönü and the defection of his more conservative supporters, the party entered the 1973 campaign perhaps less divided than at any time since the advent of the multi-party regime. The transformation in the image and  character of the RPP was deliberately engineered by Ecevit as an integral part of his electoral strategy, clearly designed to provide a moderate-left  alternative for the masses of underprivileged voters, in both city and countryside. The party was transformed from ãa classless partyä to a ãclass-based party.ä 
 ãPopulist Ecevitä ( Halkçý  Ecevit), along with signs proclaiming ãOur Hope is Ecevit (Umudumuz Ecevit), greeted the RPP leader at campaign rallies throughout the country. He was dubbed ÎKaraoðlanâ (a popular young folk hero), and his election manifesto, entitled ãTowards Bright Daysä  (Ak Günlere), was sold in large quantities. As election day neared,  a RPP victory began to appear within reach at long last. 
The RPP did score a victory, but it was hardly decisive. Perhaps the most notable feature of this election was that in some important respects the RPP and its major opponent, the JP, appeared to have switched positions with respect to the power center of the State. The  surprise of the 1973 election was the emergence of the RPP  as the first party in the country, with 33.3 per cent of the ballot and 185 seats, which was 41 short of the 226 necessary for the majority in the Assembly.  Nevertheless, this was the highest percentage of votes the RPP had won since 1961 when it had received 36.7 per cent in an election heavily loaded in its favor.  After 1961 the partyâs vote had continued to decline to 28.7 per cent in 1965 and to 27.4 per cent in 1969 amid the confusion about its ideology and the defections that followed. 
Winning 33 per cent of the vote was a remarkable achievement for a party undergoing a dramatic change of identity. It was even more remarkable when the RPP increased its votes in the following municipality elections held in the same year, raising its percentage to 37.4 percent. . 
The RPP had won these votes not in the backward regions of the country which were its traditional strongholds, but in the most advanced, industrial parts of Turkey. The RPP had captured the cities where the migrants in the shantytowns had defected from the Justice Party.   That was an encouraging sign because it signaled an important ideological shift  among an important group of voters (from both extreme left and right) who had come to see social democracy as the best option for Turkeyâs future.
The results of the 1973 election seemed to indicate that the investment had paid off, for it marked an upswing of the RPP vote, and made possible the partyâs return to governmental power in a legitimate (systemic) way. In fact the 1973 election saw the continuation  of a trend that had been already discernible in 1969, towards a distinct shift in the composition of the RPP vote. 
The data clearly indicate that RPP support had shifted dramatically from the patterns that had prevailed in the 1950âs. The most highly developed provinces, in which the party had been weakest, were now the areas of its greatest strength, while conversely, its support in the least developed provinces, which had been its stronghold (kale) during the 1950âs, dropped sharply. This pattern continued in 1977.  For instance, the RPP gathered more than 50 per cent of the vote in three provinces, significantly, the three provinces that included the largest cities in the country, Istanbul, Ankara, and Izmir. The RPPâs strength in the least developed provinces, on the other hand, declined in conformity with the national pattern up to 1965 , but thereafter failed to rise, as  the RPP Îs fortunes elsewhere did until 1990s. 
The remarkable increase in RPP voting strength in  Istanbul is particularly noteworthy. In that most highly urbanized province, the RPP vote more than doubled  between 1969 and 1973, from roughly 200,000 to nearly 500,000, or almost by 50 percent of the votes cast. In 1973, the RPP dominated the urban electorate.  This improved performance  of the RPP in urban areas was due in large part to electoral shifts among the lower classes, from the JP to the RPP. 
Interestingly, the RPPâs performance did not improve in a similar fashion in rural areas, either in more modernized or in less developed provinces. Özbudun argues that a significant realignment of Turkish parties had occurred between 1965 and 1973, shifting from cultural alignment towards class division.   This will be discussed further below.
The new left-of-center stance and the change in RPP leadership were both a response to social change and a spur to the expression of those changes through party realignment. The transformation of the RPP, after an electoral success, was officially declared in the conventions. The words Î Democratic Leftâ was officially added into the title of the second article of the party regulation in 1974. 
In the 22nd RPP convention, held in December 1974, Ecevit declared that ãthe RPPâs ÎDemocratic Leftâ manner is a leftist manner that gives greater weight to free democracy. In fact it is a further step toward the classical free democracy, because it enables us to reflect democracy to economic and social areas. To do this it binds the notion of national sovereignty with the notion of peopleâs government . A peopleâs government can only be achieved by increasing the peopleâs economic power, more than the economic power of the wealthy.â 
Ecevit tried to explain the RPPâs new direction by making reference to the old terminology (republicanism, etatism, national sovereignty and populism), as Inönü had made in 1965, to explain ãthe left of centerä. But Inönüâs explanation of Îcenter of the leftâ had been more a re-naming of a current of thought according to the political systemâs new conditions .  Ecevitâs aim was to shift the partyâs electoral base completely to adapt to the electoral system and thus win overall electoral success. 
In a speech at the 1974 party convention, Ecevit continued arguing, ãThe way to achieve this end (peopleâs government ) is not to nationalize all the means of production. In a developing country like Turkey, there is a need for nationalization. But the level of the control over the economy should be arranged in relation with the borders of free (özgürlükçü) democracy. In the examples all over the world, the countries which nationalize all the means of production do not have free democracy. In those countries I can not talk about a peopleâs government but rather a bureaucratic government above the people.ä 
Ecevitâs speech gave clues about the continuation of etatism in content but change in the ways of its implementation. The etatism of the establishment period had been both political and economic. Ecevit tried to decrease the political implementations of etatism while focusing on and continuing the economic implementations as an example for publicization.  As he continued, ãThe Democratic Left is democratic both in the aims and means to achieve that result; the border of our leftist ideology will be drawn by the people. ã 
According to Ecevit, the major differences between Îthe left of centerâ and Îdemocratic leftâ were how reforms were achieved (reform for the people versus reform by the people) and how much further the reforms would be continued. Inönü had used the word Îleftâ to relocate the partyâs position;  Ecevit openly declared a new ideological direction.

The 1973 election confirmed the logic of Ecevitâs strategy but presented him with a dilemma.  The RPP  was a prime candidate for leading a government but its choice of potential coalition partners was such that its chances of advancing any of its political causes- or its longer- term chances of building its  electoral strength- were jeopardized.  Under the circumstances, the party might have been better off to remain in opposition. That option  was blocked by disarray and mutual hostility among the right wing parties which effectively prevented them from forming a coalition with the RPP or against it. 
After prolonged bargaining among the parties and several aborted attempts to form a government, Ecevit surprised his own followers and the country by announcing  an agreement  principle for a coalition with the National Salvation Party (NSP) , led by Necmettin Erbakan. At first sight nothing seemed more far fetched or beyond reason than such a coalition. The NSP, after all, based its appeal on hostility to the principle of secularism, one of the most cherished planks in RPP platforms since the time of Atatürk, and moreover symbolized its rejection of the Western model in cultural affairs and beyond, even extending to the economic sphere. The RPP, by contrast, historically stood for the adoption of Western principles and methods, and strongly emphasized the goal of the acceptance of Turkey and Turks as equals by the West.
Both parties claimed to believe in a democracy that guaranteed the fundamental freedoms, a mixed economy, economic and social development with social justice, and an economic policy that benefited society as a whole and not only some of its groups.  Both were committed to the protection of tradesmen and artisans and their small enterprises which produced capital goods. Both sought working conditions that were humane and democratic, as well as social security, and opposed the exploitation of the people by Îbig capitalâ. To sum up, both were third world parties.  The new RPP was also nationalist but its nationalism differed from the nationalism of the establishment period. According to  the definition of 1931 RPP program, the Turkish Republic was consolidated as a state among other equal states. But, in the third world politics position Turkey, among developing countries, was in inherent conflict with developed capitalist ones.
Ahmad argues that both parties were responding to the pressures of rapid modernization, the NSP invoking Îtraditional Islamic valuesâ as a shield to protect the victims of social and economic transformation, while the RPP prescribed ãan updated Kemalist nationalism in which social welfare became a powerful ingredient. 
The 1976 RPP program, published for the 23rd party convention, was the official documentation of change within the previous ten years. To the party ideals, ÎThe Six Arrowsâ, 'the Six Rules' were added. These included: ãLiberty, Equality, Solidarity, Superiority of Labor, Integrity of Development and Self Government of the People.ä  The first three are reminiscent of the enlightened ideals of the French Revolution; the last three resembled social democratic ideals. The followers of the RPP could refer to not only the Six Arrows in the future but also to the Six Rules. 
In the program, some of the additions to the principles were ãTo democratize villager cooperatives and create joint ventures between them, thereby creating democratic solidarity. The abdication of the right of lock out. Making  land reform for poor villagers . Giving civil servants the right to form syndicates. Limiting the Stateâs rights, through public freedom and institutionalization. Forming village towns. Giving social security to craftsmen. Decreasing the tax burden on salaried people. The nationalization of energy production and distribution. Decreasing the voting age to 18 and nomination age to 21 and the abolition of Îcrimes of thoughtâ (fikir suçu)ä. 
A significant event of the 1976  convention was that the RPP decided to join the Socialists International.  This was a clear break from Inönüâs approach to socialism in the 1960s, when he had declared that ãRPP is not a socialist party and never willä. 
The impact of Turkeyâs intervention in Cyprus was equally dramatic, if not quite so, as politics at home. Overnight, Bülent Ecevit became a national hero; Îthe idealist poetâ was transformed into a Îman of actionâ. He was convinced that his party would win a landslide if early elections were held and so resigned from office. The parties of the right refused to permit an early general election. Ecevitâs resignation was followed by a long crisis and a series of right wing government coalitions (Milliyetçi Cephe, MC). 
The elections came only three years later, in 1977. Ecevit proved unable to capitalize even on his immense popularity in the wake of the Cyprus crisis of 1974. The election, once again, made the RPP the largest in the Assembly, but  left it short of a majority. The right wing was thus able  to frustrate Ecevitâs best hopes to form a stable and effective government. The rightist parties were no more successful in forming a government themselves.
Again, we see an increase of the votes of the RPP almost to the maximum of its level  in the 1977 municipal elections.  And then, the 1979 local partial elections saw a sharp drop in the RPP and a rise for the JP, the militant right-wing Nationalist Action Party (NAP) and, significantly, the extreme left.  The fact that the drop- in voter turnout  between 1977 and 1979 almost exactly matched the loss of RPP votes in the provinces involved in both elections suggests the major cause of  this downturn. 
In the 24th  RPP party convention, held in 1979, one of the reformers, Turan Güneþ , speculated on reasons for this decline. He  talked about the contradiction of support in the syndicates, Turk-is and DISK (All Turkish and Revolutionary Workerâs Syndicate) which were politically opposed to each other , unlike anywhere else in the Europe. He argued that ãa social democratic party ought to have solidarity with the working classes but the conflict between the syndicates has  created important problems for the party.ä 
The party, historically, had been perceived as closely identified with the Kemalist State, in effect, as the guardian of the State. This perception was particularly important to the military, who viewed themselves and their role in a similar light.  After the onset of weak and unstable governments in the 1960s, followed by the retirement of Ismet Inönü (the last living link with Atatürk and himself a professional military officer), the leftward shift of the RPP seemed to the military to move the party to an anti-state position. Metin Heper writes that ãAs political polarization deepened during the 1970s and the labor movement suffered spasms of organized violence, the RPP seemed to move further from its traditional role as guardian of the State. This development, along with the inability of the government to maintain or impose its authority, must have been unsettling to the military. It opened an unprecedented breach between them and the RPP and reinforced the militaryâs conception of themselves as the prime guardian of the Kemalist State. . . The way was thus open for the coup which ultimately occurred (on September 1980s).ä 
In the period, The RPP learned the rules of the game and struggled to acquire a new identity in order to win over the electorate. In the period between 1965-1970, the party, at first, re-positioned itself to the Îleft of the centerâ against its major rival the Justice Party (JP), which was on the right of center   and against the rising Turkish Labor Party (TLP) on the far left. 
1971 brought the second coup on 12 March. The coup seemed to favor RPP  at the beginning, but later acted against progressive side of the party. The RPPâs official attitude to the coup created  conflict (duality) in the party and opened the way to a contest for the leadership and ideology.  Bülent Ecevit became the new leader and opened a new era. As the system polarized in the 70âs, the party re-defined itself as Îdemocratic leftâ . The RPPâs Social Democratic orientation and commitment to fundamental socio-economic changes became more marked. 
As Karpat argues, ãAfter the natural death of Inönü in 1973, the RPP gradually discarded Kemalism as an ideology and took a position opposed totally to the basic tenets of the republican regime: ... It sought for a solid social foundation on the basis of which it could call itself a true socialist mass party.ä For the transforming of the RPP Kili writes that, ãRPP had succeeded to transform the party to the people. The change in the institution, the ideology and the people proves that... the most important change since 1960, is the decision of walking to the modernity with the people.ä 
For the period mentioned above, Sartori writes that  ãFrom early 1950âs until 1970s one of the distinguishing characteristics of the Turkish party system was the absence of turnover in the national government,  through the elections.ä  In a way, the RPP understood the situation in mid sixties and attempted to transform itself, according to the conditions of the system, to change its destiny, to increase its chances of an  electoral success. It did win an electoral success but could not be able to come to power alone because of the electoral representation system. 
Sayarý explains the fragmentation created by this electoral representation in saying, Îthe 1961 constitution facilitated the translation of the ideological and religious sectarian cleavages into the party system by partially lifting the legal restrictions.' It created the environment for the pluralisation. Between 1973-1977, the new and growing radicalization of Turkish political life added a discernible ideological dimension to the polarization among the parties.  The fragmentation and polarization had opposite effects on governmental changes in predominant party system.  None of the parties was able to obtain an electoral success and neither of them could create a long term stable coalitions. The polarization of the politics and the lack of consensus  lead to a systemic breakdown at the close of the 1970âs, leading to the coup of 12 September 1980.
The period 1965-1980 was marked by breaks imposed by the military. The military regime and its course of action toward in correlation to the RPP, is changed with the level the system and the party altered itself. This is where the negative correlation can be seen. 
The  RPPâs political tradition had indirectly effected the very nature of all the coups . The strong institutionisation and the State tradition of the party was a guaranty for the political system. Though the party could not (or did not aim to) stop (all) the coups it did prevent the shifting of the regime to long term authoritarianism.  As will see in the next chapters, the banning of RPP which was only a small evidence of what has happened, imbalanced the democracy and lead the political system into an irreparable destitution.

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